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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Putin provides unsettling answers 
In a series of recent interviews leading up to the 26 March elections, acting 
President Vladimir Putin has attempted to reassure the West that a Russia under 
his stewardship will be an engaged and responsible member of the international 
community. His efforts to dampen Western criticism of the brutal Chechen war 
have become more nuanced and tempered to his international audience. In a 
BBC interview with David Frost, Putin emphasized the Russian military's alleged 
attempts to minimize civilian casualties and compared the Chechen fighters to 
"nazi criminals." (ITAR-TASS, 1522 GMT, 6 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0307, via 
World News Connection) 
 
His comments and recollection of his past in a Kommersant interview (10 Mar 00; 
Agency WPS, via lexis-nexis), highlight specific issues that resonate strongly for 
a foreign audience. For example, he notes that he quit the Soviet KGB because 
he knew "that the Soviet Union did not have a future." Likewise, he knew that he 
"would never side" with August 1991's putschists.  
 
While some may feel swayed by these comments and the series of laudatory 
remarks from his associates, most notably his former boss, the late Anatoli 
Sobchak, Putin nevertheless responds to several key questions in an odd 
manner that can't but cause concern.  
 
Before addressing post-election apprehensions raised by Putin's recent 
interviews, I should point out some revelatory comments about his service in the 
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Yel'tsin regime. In response to a question about whether nostalgia prompted him 
to accept promotion to director of the Federal Security Services (FSB), Putin 
responded "No. Do you think I was asked? Do you think anybody wanted my 
opinion? (...) The President signed a decree and that was that." 
(KOMMERSANT, 10 Mar 00; Agency WPS, via lexis-nexis) 
 
While it is little cause for surprise that Yel'tsin had delegated a significant portion 
of his presidential duties in the past few years, it is stunning that a post as 
powerful as FSB chief could be filled without a meeting, consultation or even the 
knowledge of the appointee. Putin, later in the same interview, also made clear 
just how isolated former President Yel'tsin was from decision-making, even on 
major, substantive policy issues. 
 
The Kommersant interviewer suggests that Putin could not have launched the 
Chechen campaign on his own initiative, that Yel'tsin would have had to have 
made that decision. Putin does not revert to the standard answer of the Yel'tsin 
years, that the president himself made all final decisions. Putin instead claims, 
"Yel'tsin backed me up. (...) I merely kept him informed." 
 
While it is possible that Putin's remarks about Chechnya can be seen as an 
electoral ploy to take full responsibility for a popular policy, it seems more likely 
that his response provides further confirmation that, in the latter years of the 
Yel'tsin presidency, a group of advisers and their associates were likely making a 
broad range of significant decisions in Yel'tsin's name.  
 
Perhaps the most startling answer Putin gave in this Kommersant interview, 
however, was a distinct refusal to respond. The interviewer asked a question that 
has concerned many. Given the lack of a clear electoral platform and a 
background in the secret services, there have been widely published 
apprehensions that a Putin electoral victory would result in the establishment of 
an authoritarian police state regime. When prompted by the interviewer to 
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address the belief that he would "change dramatically right after the elections." 
Putin replied, "This is not something I will answer."  
 
Feeling reassured yet? 
 
Rhetoric or warning? 
Putin has also stepped up his verbal assault on Russia's leading financiers in 
recent weeks. In earlier remarks he claimed he would distance the oligarchs from 
state power; now he suggests he will eliminate them altogether. Speaking to 
Radio Mayak (18 Mar 00; AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, via C-afp@clari.net), 
Putin attacked the influential businessmen, who have been "merging power with 
capital." "Such a class of oligarchs will cease to exist," he claimed. 
 
While there is little doubt that threatening Russia's super rich and powerful 
business elite has popular appeal and is effective campaign rhetoric, it must 
cause some concern to the targets of his attacks. The inconsistency present in 
Putin's relationship with some of the oligarchs, and their continuing support for 
his candidacy, as contrasted with Putin's rhetoric, is reflected in the case of 
Anatoli Chubais. As in previous instances, Putin has once again managed to 
couple praise for one of Russia's kingmakers with a critical slap, leaving the 
audience to wonder at the future president's opinion of one of the West's favorite 
"reformers." Putin recently lauded Chubais as a "very good manager," but in the 
same breath derided him as a "stubborn Bolshevik," with a "very poor credit 
rating among the people." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 0740 PST, 16 Mar 00; 
via C-afp@clari.net) It is intriguing that Chubais remains an ardent Putin 
supporter despite the "ambivalence" of the acting president. Perhaps Chubais 
knows something about Putin that the public does not, or perhaps, vice versa. 
 
More concrete indications of both the influence of the oligarchs on the Putin 
government and Putin's attitude toward them, may come through actual 
government policy, as for instance in the struggle to resume "tolling" in the 
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aluminum industry. According to one report (OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, 2 Mar 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-0302, via World News Connection), the recent acquisition of Lev 
Chernoy's aluminum interests by Roman Abramovich and Boris Berezovsky 
could result in the government-approved resumption of tolling operations, 
provided Berezovsky and Abramovich continue to wield the level of influence in 
the Kremlin, which they have been rumored to have enjoyed in the past. Time will 
tell. 
 
FSB 
Ryazan bomb test 
Despite fevered denials, evidence continues to mount that the security services 
were involved in at least one of the "terrorist" bombings last September. In an 
article in The Observer (12 Mar 00; via www.newsunlimited.co.uk), the bomb 
squad officer who defused the bomb in a Ryazan apartment block was quoted as 
saying "It was a live bomb." This incident had been called a "test" of public 
alertness after those planting the bomb were discovered to be FSB officers. 
 
The bomb squad officer, Yuri Tkachenko, also claimed that, while testing the 
sugar sacks where the bomb had been placed, his gas analyzer gave a positive 
reading for Hexagen, the same explosive that was used in the Moscow 
bombings. While the FSB removed the potentially lethal sacks from the building, 
they apparently left behind the detonator, which the article's author claims was 
set for 5:30 AM. The timing of the explosion could have resulted in significant 
civilian casualties. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah Miller 
 
In balancing a cautious White House against an eager Downing Street, acting 
Russian President Vladimir Putin again has proven how easy it is to take 
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advantage of the absence of a united Western stance towards Moscow. 
Domestic pressure may have forced the Clinton administration to back away from 
its endorsement of the Kremlin's master, but its early failure to unify 
condemnation of the war in Chechnya has legitimized "engaging" Russia at any 
cost. Tony Blair has been quick to pick up where Clinton left off. 
 
Engagement postponed? 
Stung by criticism that the White House had all but endorsed Putin in the 
upcoming presidential elections, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
published an op-ed article in The Washington Post to deny the charges. The 
administration, Albright wrote, had not endorsed Putin, but merely had noted that 
Putin is "capable and energetic, knowledgeable about the issues, blunt and 
direct, with some positive things to say about economic reform, the rule of law 
and arms control. All simple statements of fact, but hardly an endorsement." 
(THE WASHINGTON POST, 8 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Albright's characterization of the administration's response to Putin was, 
however, disingenuous. Among the "simple statements of fact" that President Bill 
Clinton has made since Putin rose to power are that Russia was engaged in 
"liberating Grozny" (TIME, 1 Jan 00) and that the US "can do business with this 
man." (THE WASHINGTON POST, 17 Feb 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Human Rights Watch 
researcher Peter Bouckeart complained that "instead of using its relationship with 
Russia to bring an end to the abuses in Chechnya, the Clinton administration has 
focused on cementing its relationship with Acting President Putin, the prime 
architect of the abusive campaign in Chechnya." Albright, Bouckeart noted, had 
"traveled to Moscow while bombs were raining down on Grozny, and chose to 
focus her remarks on Acting President Putin's qualities as the new leader of 
Russia, rather than on the brutal war in Chechnya." (TESTIMONY TO THE 
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, 25 Feb 00; via www.hrw.org) 
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As subsequent clashes over Iran and Yugoslavia showed, the administration's 
embrace of Putin was not only a policy that dared not speak its name, but an 
ineffective one at that. 
 
Russia, US clash over nuclear technology to Iran  
In mid-March Russia reacted angrily to passage of a US bill that will allow 
President Clinton to impose sanctions on countries that the White House 
concludes are helping Iran to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Russian 
protests that its current contracts with Iran are harmless were undercut when the 
Czech government concluded that similar contracts with Czech companies might 
help Iran to test nuclear weapons. 
 
On 15 March President Clinton signed the bill, which permits him to ban contact 
between the American government and US companies with any foreign 
government and company that furnishes Iran with dual-use goods, services and 
technologies. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 16 Mar 00) 
 
Although relieved by the president's announcement that US support for the joint 
Russian-American international space station would remain exempt from 
sanctions, Russian officials objected that the US was bullying foreign companies 
to fall in line with its domestic legislation. "The government of the Russian 
Federation disagrees with this law, considers it discriminatory and biased 
because basically any country can be qualified as a violator by the US 
president's wish," Russian Vice Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov stated. (ITAR-
TASS, 1508 GMT, 15 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0315, via World News 
Connection) The Russian government claimed that Russian contracts to help 
Iran build a nuclear power plant in Bushehr did not violate the law, since its 
nuclear technology had no military applications. 
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The argument that Bushehr was an innocent civilian joint venture can be viewed, 
however, as a red herring -- and an ineffective one. Two weeks before Clinton 
signed the sanctions into law, the Czech parliament voted to prevent the Czech 
firm ZVVZ Milevsko from exporting air conditioning equipment purchased by a 
Russian company for use in the Bushehr plant. Czech Deputy Foreign Minister 
Hynek Kmonicek argued that, although the Bushehr plant was a civilian project, 
technologies for military applications could be tested in it. (CTK, 1818 GMT, 1 
Mar 00; FBIS-EEU-2000-0301, via World New Connection) 
 
Bushehr is also among the least threatening of the joint projects between 
Russian and Iranian firms. In 1997, the Russia was accused of transferring 
sophisticated missile guidance technology to Iran. (See ISCIP EDITORIAL 
DIGEST, 25 Sep 97) To concentrate narrowly on the military applications of the 
Bushehr project is to risk overlooking other, far more dangerous technology 
transfers. 
 
Russia and NATO: petulant partners?  
The dance of the White House and the Kremlin around questions of "engaging" 
Russia in NATO affairs also grew more complicated. Putin suggested Russia 
might some day join the alliance, while Russian actions in NATO's most complex 
mission -- Kosovo -- indicated that no amount of "involvement" could overcome 
fundamental differences between the strategic aims of Moscow and the West. 
 
In an interview with the BBC preceding British Prime Minister Tony Blair's visit to 
Russia, Putin said that Russia does not rule out someday joining NATO. "We 
believe we can talk about more profound integration with NATO," Putin told the 
BBC's David Frost, "but only if Russia is regarded as an equal partner." Putin's 
comments were "clarified" the following day by Russian Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov, who stressed that Putin had merely given a "hypothetical answer to a 
hypothetical question." (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 7 Mar 00) 
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Putin's discussion with Frost, however, offered a portrait of the acting president 
as a man in favor of broad engagement with the West. Russia had opposed 
eastern expansion of NATO, Putin suggested, only because Moscow had been 
excluded from discussion of the issue. "But this does not mean we are going to 
shut ourselves off from the world," Putin said. "Isolationism is not an option." 
(INTERFAX, 1203 GMT, 5 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0305, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Subsequent wrangling over the fate of the NATO mission in Kosovo 
demonstrated, however, that Moscow does not promise friendly cooperation 
when it pledges more engagement with the rest of the world. Even before a 
Russian soldier participating in the KFOR mission was shot in Srbica, Ivanov had 
warned that Russia might withdraw from the Kosovo mission "if the situation 
leads to the threat that we face Kosovo's separation from Yugoslavia." Ivanov 
spoke at a press conference following meetings with US and European officials 
in Lisbon. (INTERFAX, 1538 GMT, 2 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0302, via World 
News Connection) 
 
At a time when the party of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic is in some 
danger of losing power, Russian officials have also spoken strongly against 
efforts to undermine either him or his rule. Sergei Lavrov, Russia's ambassador 
to the United Nations, has accused the UN's War Crimes Tribunal of pursuing 
policies that are "biased" against Yugoslav officials. (Jamestown Foundation 
MONITOR, 1 Mar 00) NATO war games planned in Kosovo for late March and 
early April, Lavrov said, were being prepared with "downright disregard for 
Yugoslavia's sovereignty" and would "considerably destabilise not only the 
province but the region as a whole." (ITAR-TASS, 1306 GMT, 7 Mar 00; FBIS-
EEU-2000-0307, via World New Connection) 
 
In his meeting with Blair, Putin took time to stress the importance of defending 
Yugoslav integrity and to urge cooperation with Milosevic. "One can have 
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different opinions of him," Putin said, "but he is the legitimately elected president 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." (INTERFAX, 1113 GMT, 11 Mar 00; 
FBIS-EEU-2000-0311, via World New Connection) 
 
Perfidious Albion?  
Into the momentary breach between Moscow and Washington swept Tony Blair's 
Labour government, elected in 1997 in part on a pledge to pursue a foreign 
policy more "ethical" than that of its Conservative predecessors. Although Blair 
hacks spun tales of how tough Blair had been on Putin about Chechnya, the 
leaders' reported disagreements did not prevent them from enjoying a night at 
the St. Petersburg opera watching the latest production of Prokofiev's "War and 
Peace." 
 
In several respects, the Blair visit broke new ground in audacity. By talking of 
long-term programs for investment and restructuring with an acting president 
facing election in less than two weeks, Blair gave Putin an endorsement far more 
ringing than any even fawning Washington had offered to date. Blair, 
furthermore, reportedly offered Putin a full range of services from financial and 
press relations gurus to advise Putin's government on "Labour policies such as 
welfare-to-work and the drives against homelessness and crime." (THE DAILY 
MAIL, 13 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Clinton and Blair have long been engaged in a friendly contest over who will earn 
the legacy as the most effective reformer of the post-Cold War Left. They will 
now compete, it seems, for the privilege to claim Putin as their Gorbachev. Putin 
seems happy to have two Western leaders competing for his attention. The 
deeper each is "engaged" in his work, one suspects, the more difficult it will be to 
criticize Putin should his regime pursue a politics more deadly than an anodyne 
"Third Way." 
 
Strategic cooperative partnership expands, rumors notwithstanding 
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Over the past few weeks several rumors concerning the future of Russian-
Chinese relations emanated from Moscow. In addition to false rumors that Beijing 
was going to buy the Russian space station Mir for several billion dollars, 
anonymous defense sources allegedly leaked the contents of a "secret decree" 
barring the Russian defense industry from selling any military production licenses 
to China. Also, the newspaper Segodnya noted a change in the government's 
China rhetoric suggesting that the Putin government was moving away from the 
Russo-Chinese "strategic cooperative partnership." (Jamestown Foundation 
MONITOR, 14 Mar 00) 
 
Sorting through Moscow's rumors can be tedious work, but a flurry of diplomatic 
activity between Russia and China over the past few months helps to paint a 
clearer picture. Since Yel'tsin's trip to Beijing last December, the Chinese foreign 
and defense ministers have separately visited Moscow and Russia's deputy 
foreign minister has gone to Beijing. Moreover, despite Segodnya's report of a 
change in Russia's strategic partnership rhetoric, during these last four meetings 
references to it have not decreased. When commenting on Chinese Foreign 
Minister Tang Jiaxuan's trip to Moscow in late February, strategic cooperative 
rhetoric abounded; Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said, "Russia is satisfied with the 
strategic partnership with China." (XINHUA, 1544 GMT, 29 Feb 00; FBIS-EAS-
2000-0229, via World News Connection) Putin likewise said, "Russia attaches 
great importance to the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership of cooperation." 
(ITAR-TASS, 1504 GMT, 1 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0301, via World News 
Connection) Meanwhile, during his trip to Beijing, Deputy Foreign Minister Ilya 
Klebanov said he was sent with "an order to strengthen friendship and trade and 
economic relations." (ITAR-TASS, 2341 GMT, 1 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0301, 
via World News Connection) 
 
The only change in rhetoric has been an addition to the original language. This 
was especially clear during Klebanov's trip in early March, during which he noted 
a "certain dissatisfaction with trade and economic cooperation." (ITAR-TASS, 4 
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Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) In effect, Klebanov's trip was a concrete indicator of 
Russian desires to broaden the strategic cooperative partnership by deepening 
economic ties, especially in the trade, science and technology, energy and 
nuclear power sectors.  
 
This initiative is part of a deepening of Russian-Chinese relations over the past 
few years. Beginning with military-technical ties, the partnership has broadened 
over the past 18 months and through common stances on many international and 
regional issues such as ABM, Iraq, Kosovo, the Korean peninsula, Taiwan and 
Chechnya. At the recent meetings in Moscow and Beijing, the sides reconfirmed 
their common views and expanding partnership, but now Russia is purposefully 
expanding bilateral relations in other spheres.  
 
Klebanov's visit signaled Russia's attempt to target specifically non-military-
technical sectors for expansion. At meetings with State Councilor Wu Yi, 
Klebanov signed a protocol to step up work on two gas pipeline projects, as well 
as consideration for a third Russian-Chinese pipeline. (ITAR-TASS, 3 Mar 00; via 
lexis-nexis) The protocol also included provisions for increasing bilateral 
cooperation in outer space, the high-tech industry, commerce, and investment, 
among others. Klebanov also met separately with President Jiang Zemin, 
Premier Zhu Rongji, and General Zhang Wannian, during which several "current 
issues" were discussed including the Sovremmeny destroyer deal and possible 
Russian assistance in developing the Chinese space program and station. 
(JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE, 4 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) Thus, while the 
Chinese may not be buying Mir, they will certainly accept Russian help to build 
their own.  
 
These decisions, coupled with the continuity of rhetoric on both sides, suggest 
that if Russia is secretly planning to limit China's purchase of Russian military 
licenses, it is not because Russia intends to limit the entire Russian-Chinese 
partnership. To the contrary, by taking concrete steps to expand bilateral 
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relations outside of the military-technical dialogue, Russia is expanding the 
substance of the partnership as a whole.  
 
And yet there is one last rumor that hasn't yet been proven true or false. 
According to Klebanov, Putin and Jiang will sign a "very important document" at 
the Russian-Chinese Beijing summit this summer. The contents of the alleged 
document have not been released, but according to Klebanov, it "will declare and 
record the actions of our countries on [attaining] true strategic partnership." 
(ITAR-TASS, 1459 GMT, 2 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0302 via World News 
Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Media 
By Jonathan Solomon 
 
A covert war on the independent press? 
For those who thought that the Babitsky affair was an isolated case, think again. 
Recent weeks have featured a number of incidents involving the independent 
media that have aroused suspicions of "power agency" involvement.  
 
Incident #1: Borovik's 'Top Secret' 
Early on the morning of 9 March, a YAK-40 business jet bound for Kyiv crashed 
seconds after takeoff from Moscow's Sheremetevo Airport. Among the nine 
fatalities were muckraking journalist Artyom Borovik and oil magnate Ziya 
Bazhaev, an ethnic Chechen. Borovik was president of the Soversheno Sekretno 
(Top Secret) publishing house. While the Moscow Transport Prosecutor's Office 
felt that the crash was an accident stemming from a violation of safety rules, the 
FSB made a statement the afternoon of the 9th that suggested Chechen 
terrorists might have been responsible. According to FSB spokesman Alexander 
Zdanovich, Chechen militants had previously been pressuring Bazhaev to give 
financial support for their war effort, but the wealthy oil magnate refused. 
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Zdanovich covered his assertion by saying that "it is premature yet to firmly state 
that it was an act of terror." (ITAR-TASS, 1637 GMT, 9 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0309, via World News Connection) Indeed, many technical factors of the crash 
did not add up, leading to speculation of foul play, but not necessarily by the 
Chechens. (JOHNSON'S RUSSIA LIST, 10 Mar 00) 
 
Borovik rose to prominence as a pioneering investigative journalist during the 
early days of glasnost, writing probing pieces about the Afghan war among other 
subjects. He worked for the American CBS network's flagship newsmagazine "60 
Minutes" during the early 1990s, and also began publishing his own monthly 
investigative paper, Soversheno Sekretno, that quickly became popular for its 
scandalous revelations of corporate and governmental corruption. Soversheno 
Sekretno created the core of a mass-media company that became involved in 
television production and book publishing. In 1999, Borovik entered into a 
partnership with US News and World Report, and with that publication's funding 
started an investigative weekly titled Versiya. 
 
The attendance at Borovik's funeral was a virtual who's who of Russian politics, 
minus acting President Putin, who sent his condolences to Borovik's family and 
praised his work as a "famous journalist" whose "readers impatiently waited for 
his publications." Grigory Yavlinsky and Yuri Luzhkov were there, as was 
Borovik's close friend Yevgeny Primakov. The overwhelming feeling in the air 
was that Borovik had met his fate at the hands of an enemy he had made in the 
course of his investigative career. "I don't understand how society and the 
government can possibly be indifferent to threats addressed against journalists. 
Why is there no reaction? Why are we so helpless? Why can't we twist these 
scoundrels' heads off?" declared Primakov. (MOSCOW TIMES, 14 Mar 00; via 
www.moscowtimes.ru) 
 
The question is, if Borovik and Bazhaev were assassinated, who ordered the hit? 
Allegedly, Bazhaev was not even supposed to be on that flight. According to the 
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Moscow Times, Bazhaev had a ticket to fly to Kyiv that morning on a Transaero 
aircraft set to take off only a half-hour later than the fatal flight, but the Transaero 
was delayed for an hour, so he switched to his friend and business associate 
Borovik's chartered plane. Bazhaev's associates thus found it unlikely that he 
could have been the target due to the short notice involved in his change in 
itinerary. (MOSCOW TIMES, 11 Mar 00; via www.moscowtimes.ru) 
 
So if Borovik was the target, what was the reason? A frightening possibility 
emerges from the fact that Versiya had been investigating the Ryazan incident 
last fall, in which a bomb was found in an apartment building following the pattern 
of the other "Chechen terrorist attacks" that eventually led to the current 
adventure in Chechnya. However, the FSB claimed that the incident had not 
involved a live bomb, and instead had been a test of local law enforcement 
agencies' responses to such a threat. However, Versiya and Novaya gazeta, in 
investigations independent of each other, recently turned up strong evidence that 
the FSB was directly involved in the incident -- that agents had set a real bomb 
and the Ryazan apartment building was supposed to be another "terrorist attack." 
(MOSCOW TIMES, 16 Mar 00; via www.moscowtimes.ru)  
 
The implications are obvious. If the bombings were the work of the FSB in order 
to incite terror amongst the Russian people and build popular support for a return 
to Chechnya, they would have been planned while Putin was still director of the 
FSB. If the whole "terror campaign" were to prove a sinister hoax and were 
exposed as such, rationale for the return to Chechnya -- as well as a Putin 
regime -- would evaporate. Needless to say, Putin would be in a lot of trouble. It 
is too early to tell, but the possibility definitely exists that Borovik was silenced by 
an enemy he was only beginning to discover, and that he had uncovered 
something that this enemy deemed critical. 
 
Incident #2: An attack on Novaya gazeta 
 15 
While Versiya has only published one article that probes Ryazan, Novaya gazeta 
has been publishing a series on the topic. Its last report on its investigation into 
the bombing attempt hit the newsstands on 13 March. Just before 3 PM Moscow 
time on 15 March, shortly before the Thursday edition went to press, someone 
hacked into the paper's computer network and erased the layouts for that and the 
following Monday's issues. Deputy Editor Sergei Sokolov believed that the cyber 
attack was targeted at one of the articles in the Thursday edition. "There are 
many possibilities. Naturally, most of the articles were about the election 
campaign," said Sokolov. According to Sokolov, investigative pieces that 
revealed the sources of funding for Yel'tsin's 1996 and Putin's current campaign 
were to be the highlights of that issue.  
 
No article on Ryazan was scheduled for the issue in question. Still, the author of 
the Ryazan series, Pavel Voloshin, was convinced that the attack was related to 
his investigation. In his 13 March article, he had revealed that a paratrooper 
named Alexei P. had been guarding a storehouse last September that contained 
sacks marked "sugar." When the paratrooper and a friend opened one to 
"sweeten their tea" and it tasted amiss, they notified their superiors, who tested 
the "sugar" and found it to be the explosive Hexagen. In the Ryazan apartment, 
similar sacks of sugar with a detonator were found. For their part, the 
paratroopers were allegedly warned by FSB agents that they had "exposed state 
secrets" and that they were to forget all that they had seen. Voloshin concluded 
this damning article by posing direct questions to the FSB to explain the reports. 
He felt that "the FSB answered in an untraditional way." (MOSCOW TIMES, 16 
Mar 00; via www.moscowtimes.ru)  
 
Though this incident is particularly suspicious, according to National Press 
Institute program director and Moscow Times contributor Robert Coalson, it is not 
unusual. "It happens in the regions fairly regularly. About once a month or so, 
either a paper gets its computers wiped out or the whole print run gets 
impounded." (MOSCOW TIMES, 16 Mar 00; via www.moscowtimes.ru) What 
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seems different is that this is the first time, at least in a while, that a major 
metropolitan paper was the target. Novaya gazeta, like Versiya, is known for its 
probing and sensational investigations. The two also hold the distinction of being 
the only two major publications digging into Ryazan. It would seem that if Novaya 
gazeta was attacked for Voloshin's work, it was more of a warning based on the 
content of the previous issue than an attempt to prevent a specific article's 
publication in the current one.  
 
Incident #3: Of muggings and moles 
Vladimir Gusinsky's independent media empire supported Fatherland-All Russia 
and, to a lesser extent, YABLOKO during the Duma elections in December. 
Increasingly, his flagship holding, NTV, has been hostile to Putin's electoral 
campaign and also has covered the Chechnya war with a more critical eye than 
most other outlets. Its political satire puppet show "Kukly" has particularly 
aroused the ire of Putin supporters for its "public insult," and ignited "a special 
rage and frenzy" of the acting president. In early February, several professors at 
St. Petersburg University published a petition in the city government paper 
Sankt-Peterburgskiye vedomosti stating that the show was at least an "abuse of 
freedom of the press" and possibly criminal. (MOSCOW TIMES, 10 Feb 00; via 
www.moscowtimes.ru) 
 
And now, the intrigue. On 10 January, a young man named Denis Filin was 
detained for questioning regarding a purse that had been stolen by one of his 
friends. What makes this special is that Filin's mother, Eleonora Filina, is host of 
a cultural music program on NTV. What makes this even more special is that, 
according to Filina, the FSB tried to force the local authorities to charge her son 
formally as an accomplice, and then allegedly made an attempt to recruit her as 
an agent within NTV. A month after the mugging, Filina received a phone call 
from a man named Andrei Ganenko, who identified himself as working with 
"institutes of higher learning." Ganenko suggested that he could help her with her 
son's troubles, but not for money or plain goodwill, and instructed her to keep the 
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conversation secret. What struck Filina was that her son had only been held 
temporarily for questioning, and had not been charged, so her son required no 
"help." 
 
Two days after Ganenko's call, a police investigator called her to inform her that 
he, too, had been the recipient of peculiar calls from Ganenko. She was told by 
the officer that Ganenko had tried to persuade him to charge young Denis in 
order to "keep his mother in tension," but the officer assured her that such efforts 
would not work. The officer, when interviewed by Novaya gazeta, confirmed 
Ganenko's attempts to affect the case, and also said that Ganenko had told him 
that he was interested in Filin's mother because of "the very tense relations 
between NTV and the FSB." For the agency's part, FSB spokesman Zdanovich 
denied that NTV was being targeted. 
 
As for the "institutes of higher learning" comment, according to the Moscow 
Times, Putin said in an interview for Kommersant that when he was in law school 
at Leningrad State University, he was approached by a KGB recruiter at his 
home who identified himself as one who "works with institutions of higher 
learning." (MOSCOW TIMES, 14 Mar 00; via www.moscowtimes.ru) If what Filina 
claims is true, then she was indeed the target of a hostile recruiting attempt by a 
state security agency that sought to place a mole within NTV. Putin was not 
kidding when he said that "Russia should be a dictatorship of law." 
 
The not-so-covert war on the media 
Putin's recent statements that, in his future administration, the influence of the 
oligarchs would be drastically reduced, seems to have struck Boris Berezovky 
where it counts. ORT was a strong supporter of the Kremlin-allied Unity bloc in 
the December elections. But recently, ORT's coverage style has changed. 
 
For once, Rossiyskaya gazeta astutely observed "one of the country's main 
television channels, which previously refrained from playing up the federal 
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casualties in Chechnya, has recently begun steering everything in that direction." 
The government rag suggested that the reason was to "drive down the popularity 
rating of the most likely contender for the presidency" because "the actual owner 
of the television station associates this contender with the establishment of an 
economy based on corporate entities, which he does not want, to replace the 
present economy based on individual entities." (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 2 Mar 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0302, via World News Connection) Not too subtle, was it?  
 
On 29 February, Press Minister Mikhail Leslin announced that ORT's broadcast 
license, as well as that of Luzhkov-allied TV Center, would not be automatically 
renewed, and that their licenses would be put up for a tender of 30 million rubles 
on 24 May. (INTERFAX, 1202 GMT, 29 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0229, via World 
News Connection) 
 
Even the independent Moscow Times is under assault. According to its editor, 
Matt Bivens, a $9 million tax bill was recently levied against the paper based 
upon the claim that "any article mentioning anything that can be bought or sold is 
an advertisement," but they beat it in the courts. (THE WASHINGTON TIMES, 27 
Feb 00) No subtlety lost here, either. 
 
Putin's campaign also issued an alarming statement on 4 March that can be 
interpreted as a harbinger of much of what has been mentioned in this piece. 
"The press service of the election headquarters will continue to closely watch all 
facts or lies in respect of the candidate for the post of Russian President V. V. 
Putin, and reserves the right to use all means available in its arsenal for -- as it 
has been stated more than once -- an 'asymmetrical' answer to the 
provocations."(ITAR-TASS, 1220 GMT, 4 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0304, via 
World News Connection) Arsenals? Asymmetrical responses? It sounds more 
like a statement issued during an international game of crisis brinksmanship than 
something that would come out of the campaign office of a baby-kissing 
candidate.  
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Ladies and gentlemen, a multi-front, open war has been declared upon the press 
in Russia. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
The reintegration of Chechnya into the Russian fold continues 
The Russian government is bringing Chechnya back into the federation in three 
ways. First, 10-12 districts in Chechnya will be allowed to participate in the 26 
March presidential elections. Over 300 electoral stations have been set up in 
anticipation of the upcoming vote. All eligible voters are encouraged to 
participate, though there appears to be a problem with the availability of 
identification papers as a result of the recent fighting. CEC chairman Vladimir 
Veshnyakov says that a solution will be devised soon. (ITAR-TASS, 1050 GMT, 
1 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0301, via World News Connection) 
 
Second, there are suggestions for rebuilding the Chechen economy. Acting 
President Vladimir Putin has drafted a program for developing the North 
Caucasus including, of course, Chechnya. He envisions a large public works 
program for Chechnya to rebuild its damaged infrastructure as well as its more 
viable industry. The plan also calls for the creation of small plots of agricultural 
land to be distributed to the population to increase self-sufficiency. How he plans 
to pay for this plan is not clear. (ITAR-TASS, 1408 GMT, 24 Feb 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0224) 
 
The third development is disturbing and has the potential to increase the power 
of the presidency significantly. Putin is being pressured by Federation Council 
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Chairman Yegor Stroev, among others, to extend direct rule over Chechnya. 
Stroev says that "[Putin] agreed that direct presidential supervision over 
Chechnya is necessary, but only after the presidential elections." He has assured 
Putin that whatever laws are needed to facilitate Moscow's direct rule would be 
quickly drafted and passed. Stroev believes that both houses of the Federal 
Assembly would be willing to pass a bill "on a special administrative regime in 
places where federal laws are not observed." [Emphasis added] He makes the 
troubling request, "Let Chechnya be a precedent." (ITAR-TASS, 1446 GMT, 12 
Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000- 0312, via World News Connection) 
 
The last thing Russian democracy needs is a law allowing the president to 
suspend local government and impose direct rule based on some vague 
assessment of regional observance of federal law. Such a law would constitute 
the thin edge of a wedge leading to the slow elimination of the last check on the 
president's almost imperial power -- federalism. 
 
Back to the future, or from election to appointment 
Once again, the proposal has been made to return to a system of selecting 
regional governors by presidential appointment. This system was used from 1991 
to 1994 when governorships in all 89 regions became elective posts. Aman 
Tuleev, the head of the Kemerovo Oblast' and a presidential candidate, issued 
the suggestion last month. There has been some support from other governors, 
though not much. It should also be noted that this idea is usually presented as 
part of a larger slate of reform proposals intended to strengthen state control over 
the regions. Other proposals include cutting the number of regions from 89 to 32, 
or alternatively establishing "super-regions" which would roughly coincide with 
the present eight economics associations. Also discussed are proposals to 
extend the Russian president's term of office from four years to seven, as well as 
doing the same for the offices of the country's governors.  
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The proposal to return to the system of appointed governors-general has 
received more attention than the other proposals most likely because, first, it 
accords with Putin's autocratic tendencies, such as his quiet replacement of 14 
presidential representatives in the regions with former FSB officers. Appointing 
governors, therefore, may be a more attractive option for extending his power 
than the reorganization of Russia's regions. And second, it is election time. 
Issues that normally would not have been given much attention often become 
topics of great debate during campaign seasons and this may be such a case. 
 
Even so, it is hard to understand why duly elected governors with a significant 
amount of autonomy from Moscow due precisely to their elective status would 
want to subjugate themselves to the whims of a potential autocrat through a 
process of appointment. There are several possible reasons. First, and these all 
fall under the same heading of protecting governors from their own constituents, 
some governors may not be re-electable. By swearing allegiance to Putin, they 
may retain their offices and not-inconsequential perks. Second, an appointive 
position may provide protection from local power brokers, such as mayors and 
heads of important business concerns. This would significantly change the 
balance of power in favor of the governors if they knew they had the federal state 
on their side when battling with local foes. Third, eliminating elections would not 
only do away with the unpleasant business of kissing babies and stumping 
around the backwoods looking for votes, it would also remove the need to drum 
up campaign funds, which often leaves politicians indebted to their contributors 
who are again those same local power brokers. 
 
A fourth reason may be more tactical. Citizens who are unhappy with their 
regional leaders may find it presently attractive, though maybe unwise, to have 
their leaders appointed by a popular president. Tuleev is running for the 
presidency and this may be a campaign position -- one which Putin and his 
supporters find easy to support. 
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Yet the constitutionality of such a law or edict is questionable, regardless of the 
legality of its passage. First, Article 131 of the constitution states that, "[t]he 
structure of bodies of local self-government shall be determined by the 
population independently." This suggests that, regardless of what Putin or any of 
the governors say, the people (or their elected representatives) in each region 
must independently decide if they want the president to appoint their chief 
executive. It would undoubtedly require amending a good number of regional 
constitutions one at a time, a tortuous process which would most likely net a 
mixed system of both appointed and elected governors. 
 
Second, the constitution states that each region is to have two representatives in 
the Federation Council -- one from the executive branch and one from the 
legislative. If the governors are appointed, one-half of the Federation Council 
would be indirect presidential appointees. This would mean a violation of Article 
10 of the constitution which says that, "[s]tate power in the Russian Federation 
shall be exercised on the basis of the separation of the legislative, executive and 
judiciary branches. The bodies of legislative, executive and judiciary powers shall 
be independent."  
 
One way out is to change the Constitution, but many proposals for amending it 
have met with no success. It is no doubt a very difficult process and may not be 
possible -- or necessary. Yel'tsin's past acts suggest another option by his own 
lackadaisical adherence to the constitution. Putin could simply ignore it.  
 
Whether Russians have a natural affinity for strongmen as leaders is certainly 
debatable, but the popular clamor for Putin, considering his ominous mutterings 
about Russia's need for an Iron Presidency (an obvious reference to Bismarck's 
own Iron Chancellery), certainly fits the pattern. Putin's potential victory on 26 
March may be Russia's last real presidential election for a long while. If his recent 
comments are to be believed, Putin may find elections in the future to be 
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"destabilizing" and therefore unwise in a time of national "disunity." Perhaps 
Putin's Unity [sic] will triumph after all. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By LCDR James Duke Jr. 
 
Feuding neighbors on the Black Sea 
Spring hopes for more neighborly relations between Russia's Black Sea Fleet 
and its Ukrainian hosts have foundered as the two parties quarrel over energy 
debts and accusations of broken agreements. On 28 February, Ukraine froze the 
bank accounts of 15 Russian Black Sea fleet units in the ports Sevastopol and 
Feodosiya due to the fleet's unpaid electrical bill. (RIA NEWS AGENCY, 28 Feb 
00; BBC, via lexis-nexis) On 29 February Ukraine authorities commenced cutting 
off electricity to the units. Ukraine authorities also allegedly detained fleet officials 
for tax evasion. The Russian defense ministry called the detentions "groundless" 
and hurled back accusations that Ukraine was discriminating against the Russian 
fleet and also breaking a July agreement to offset Russia's electrical debt with 
Ukraine's natural gas debt. (UKRAINIAN NEWS CHANNEL TELEVISION, 3 Mar 
00; BBC, via lexis-nexis) Another indication that relations between the two 
neighbors were heading downward was Ukraine's announcement that it would 
restrict participation with Russia's Black Sea Fleet in the joint naval exercise 
"Peace Waterway" scheduled for Autumn 2000. The Russian media were quick 
to point out that, despite fuel and financing problems, Ukraine actively 
participates in NATO's Partnership for Peace program; one article threatened a 
continued deterioration in relations would result in a new naval build-up on the 
Crimea. (KOMMERSANT-DAILY, 2 Mar 00; Agency WPS, via lexis-nexis) 
However, the Russian press did not acknowledge the fact that the US Navy gives 
substantial material and expert assistance to the Ukraine Navy, allowing for 
participation in NATO-sanctioned exercises. In an effort to further their new 
relationship, US Navy vessels have visited Ukraine ports on 19 occasions since 
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1994. (PROCEEDINGS, March 00) It is doubtful Ukraine receives much in return 
from Russia. 
 
Like nearly everyone else living in Ukraine, personnel in the Black Sea Fleet may 
be experiencing the effects of Ukraine's energy shortage. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 
6 Dec 99) The power interruptions usually begin in the early evenings and last for 
a few hours, a peak demand period for Ukraine's utilities. However, Ukraine has 
experienced an energy crisis for nearly three months without any reported power 
cuts to the Black Sea Fleet, so the blackouts' timing may be tied to the dispute 
over the value of Ukraine's natural gas debt to Russia, and the fleet's electrical 
bill arrears. Until there is an agreement over the value of their respective energy 
debts, there cannot be a subsequent offset agreement. Ukraine appears to be 
using the situation to put pressure on Russia for additional negotiating leverage. 
 
Erratic electrical service may be only a nuisance to Russian units, however, it 
degrades the fleet's readiness. For safety and security reasons its meager fuel 
allowances must be used to power shipboard emergency diesel generators 
instead of at-sea training. (NTV INTERNATIONAL, 5 Mar 00; BBC, via lexis-
nexis) This is probably a small price to pay for the fleet's influence. Russia views 
the Black Sea bases as strategically important for continued access to the 
Mediterranean, influence in Eastern Europe, and the proximity of "external 
threats" such as NATO member Turkey and other non-NATO, Western-leaning 
states like Ukraine and Georgia. The gray warships flying the Russian flag in 
Ukraine territory also promote Russia's self-proclaimed "great power" status, not 
a mutually beneficial security arrangement. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Russian scheme gets nowhere, but the message is loud and clear 
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In a bold pre-election move, acting President Vladimir Putin has provided yet 
another glimpse of Russia's CIS policy. Under the guise of combating terrorism, 
the CIS interior ministers held an emergency session in Moscow from 10-11 
March at Russia's behest. Although the meeting produced few tangible results, 
Russia made its power designs in the CIS clear. 
 
The participants at the Moscow meeting discussed the findings of the CIS 
Executive Working Group's project on terrorism. Discussion of the project began 
as early as last September, when Russia first used terms like "antiterrorism" to 
legitimize its actions in Dagestan. At the time, several CIS bodies -- including the 
CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, CIS defense ministers, and then Prime 
Minister Putin -- began to discuss possible joint efforts, resulting in the formation 
of the working group. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 27 Sep 99 and 1 Nov 99) Upon the 
conclusion of the March meeting, Putin reiterated the pervasiveness of terrorism 
and the "broad network of centers" that pose a threat to stability across the 
globe, especially in the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia.  
 
Despite Putin's strong rhetoric to the contrary, the emergency meeting produced 
few results. According to Putin, the CIS will decide to create a Russian-led and -
financed antiterrorism center and an antiterrorism program which could allow 
Russian FSB units to be stationed in CIS countries "when necessary." Despite 
Putin's matter-of-fact statement, he downplayed the fact that the interior 
ministers' vote on the matter had been only "nearly unanimous," forcing the issue 
back to the working group to be "perfected." (INTERFAX, 1852 GMT, 10 Mar 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-0310, via World News Connection) In an apparent attempt to 
clarify the acting president's ominous statements, Russian Security Council 
Secretary Sergei Ivanov emphasized that there are no plans to form a joint CIS 
antiterrorism special forces unit. But his statement only reconfirmed the 
possibility that Russian troops might be stationed on foreign soil, a sobering 
prospect for many CIS states. According to Ivanov, once a CIS-wide antiterrorism 
database is up and working, they will move to "practical cooperation," meaning 
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possible Russian deployment of Alfa unit troops to CIS countries. (INTERFAX, 
2022 GMT, 10 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0310, via World News Connection) Not 
surprisingly, the initiative did not gain unanimous support.  
 
Thus far, CIS member state officials have made no statements on the matter, but 
given their past aversion to Russian dominance, it is worth hypothesizing that 
most GUUAM members are opposed to this latest Russian shenanigan. 
According to CIS Executive Secretary Yuri Yarov, now that the issue has been 
sent back to the working group, discussion will have to wait until the next CIS 
foreign ministers' meeting in either April or May. However, if the latest meeting 
serves as evidence, the chances of approval by GUUAM members are slim, and 
without their approval, the CIS-wide center and program will never materialize. 
But even if the issue is never adopted by the CIS as a whole, it serves as an 
ominous reminder of Russia's newly invigorated and aggressive CIS policy under 
Putin. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Clinton just says 'no' to Yushchenko  
Administration officials, financial analysts and opposition party leaders must be 
waiting for the other shoe to drop. On 14 March, the IMF accused Ukraine of 
falsifying data in order to qualify for loan tranches, and imposed a limited penalty 
on the country. The fund is still waiting, however, for the results of a 
PricewatershouseCoopers audit of the Ukrainian National Bank that will be 
completed on 31 March. 
 
Even without further revelations, Ukraine's relationship with the IMF has taken a 
pummeling. That pummeling has, in turn, reportedly led to a not-so-subtle snub 
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from President Bill Clinton. Clinton had been scheduled to meet with Viktor 
Yushchenko during Yushchenko's first visit to Washington, DC as Ukrainian 
prime minister. According to The New York Times, however, just days before 
Yushchenko was to leave for the US, he was told that Clinton would be unable to 
meet with him after all. "There was the sense that they should go fix this and then 
talk about a visit," a senior administration official was quoted as saying. "They 
clearly have some business to do at home to clean up this problem." (THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, 16 Mar 00) Of course, Ukraine denies that Yushchenko's trip was 
canceled due to any snub by Clinton; they say Yushchenko needed to stay home 
to head the investigation of the mining accident. 
 
The IMF problem apparently stems from a system of "round-tripping" developed 
by Ukrainian officials to give the impression that their cash reserves were higher 
than they actually were. The IMF said last week that, had they known how low 
the reserves really were, they would not have dispersed the last three or four 
tranches to the country. The National Bank reportedly transferred approximately 
$150 million to a bank in Cyprus, and then transferred it back to Ukraine's 
reserve accounts in order to present the appearance of higher cash availability.  
 
It is important to note, however, that there does not seem to be -- at least at this 
point -- any suggestion of an improper use of IMF money. Unlike the recent 
Russian money-laundering scandal, where officials may have used IMF money 
for personal gain, it appears that the entire Ukrainian problem revolves around 
the "round-tripping" scheme.  
 
Knowing this, it is interesting that the penalty just imposed on Ukraine is the 
same one given to Russia: All future disbursements will remain in an IMF 
account and will never actually be transferred to Ukraine. It is also interesting to 
note that, while US administration officials are apparently refusing to meet with 
Ukraine's leaders, they have been eager to meet with Vladimir Putin whenever 
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and wherever he wants. While Ukraine is told to "clean" its house, Russia keeps 
dropping bombs on Chechnya and awaits its next IMF tranche.  
 
Helping the Communist Party grow 
On 9 March, a group of students took over the Communist Party headquarters in 
Kyiv, poured gasoline around the building and threatened to burn it down if a list 
of demands was not met. The students, who are reported to be from a group 
called either "Independent Ukraine" or the "Ukraine Self-Dependence Group," 
demanded that the Communist Party be outlawed, Russian-language schools be 
closed, pensions be paid in full and Ukraine leave the Commonwealth of 
Independent States.  
 
Throughout the ordeal, which lasted 13 hours, Rukh leader Gennady Udavenko 
acted as mediator, thereby identifying his organization with the students who had 
been termed "radicals" by the media. The Communist Party, meanwhile, took full 
advantage of the standoff, distributing a leaflet condemning the students as 
"terrorists," and urging "all honest people" to stand up against "fascism, 
dictatorship and lawlessness." (REUTERS, 1204 GMT, 10 Mar 00; via America 
Online) Largely thanks to Udavenko's efforts, the students eventually 
surrendered, promising to use their trial as a trial of the Communist Party.  
 
Following the arrest of the group -- which consisted of 10 men and one woman -- 
it was revealed that four of the students were members of Rukh, and that the 
organization would be paying for their attorneys. "This action was a customary 
way of protest against the domination of former Communist cadres, [and] the 
domination of pro-Russian sentiments in our mass media," said Olena 
Bendarenko, the deputy head of Rukh. (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1443 EST, 10 
Mar 00; via America Online) 
 
President Kuchma's administration has been quick to distance itself from the 
students. It is unfortunate that Rukh did not follow such a strategy. At a time 
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when Russia is once again complaining about what it perceives as restrictions on 
the Russian language, and when the country faces its worst ever economic 
downturn, extremism and radicalization can be dangerous. Most of all, they can 
push individuals to support the very thing being protested. The Communist Party, 
withering on the vine, may just have been given a healthy dose of water. 
Unfortunately, it seems to have come out of Rukh's rations.  
 
BELARUS 
Marching for freedom -- again 
It seems the protesters who participated in the Freedom March II on 15 March 
didn't give the Belarusian government what it was looking for -- an excuse to 
crack down on demonstrations. So, they had to make up one. 
 
The protest, which included anywhere from 15,000 to 25,000 persons, depending 
on whose estimate you believe, concluded peacefully and without incident. 
Belarusian authorities seem to have learned an important lesson from last year's 
Freedom March I; attacking protesters will get you more international attention 
than not attacking protesters. So, according to all reports, the police were civil 
and even friendly.  
 
Following the event, the deputy of the Minsk City Council, Viktor Chikin, told 
Belarusian Television that the march had gone without incident. The head of the 
OSCE monitoring delegation in Belarus wrote to several government officials 
following the march and took note of Chikin's remarks. Hans-Georg Weick wrote, 
"As far as I understand, according to a public statement by the Deputy of the 
Minsk City Council, Mr. Viktor Chikin, the march was carried out with almost no 
incident of violence or unrest and with little disruption to the life of the city. 
Furthermore, according to Mr. Chikin, the march organizers fulfilled all promises 
made to the city authorities regarding the conduct of the event." (BELAPAN, 
0330 GMT, 17 Mar 00) 
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Less than one day later, however, Chikin revised his comments. Chikin appeared 
on television on 16 March to say that marches like these will no longer be 
allowed in Minsk, based on the bad behavior of the protesters. According to 
Belapan, Chikin said demonstrators had "failed to keep their promise not to block 
traffic. The official pointed out that the movement of vehicles was stopped for 
several hours because of the demonstration." He also "accused demonstrators of 
provoking an assault on a correspondent of Russia's NTV television network and 
said that only the police's self-restraint helped prevent disorder in the city." 
(BELAPAN, 0330 GMT, 17 Mar 00) 
 
Presumably, officials hope they can stop, or at least limit, the next demonstration 
scheduled to be held in Minsk on 25 March. So far, however, that plan doesn't 
appear to working, as opposition figures now seem more determined than ever to 
hold the demonstration. They were no doubt emboldened by the massive 
response to this last demonstration, which attracted more participants than any 
protest in the last year. 
 
Belarusian authorities will keep trying, however. One day after they announced 
the restriction on demonstrations in Minsk, opposition leader Andrei Klimov was 
sentenced to six years in prison for "tax fraud and abuse of power." (AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE, 17 Mar 00; via lexis-nexis) At the same time, officials fired 
Yaraslaw Beklyamishchaw, the host of the "Krok-2" television program, for 
"flagrant violation of the rules of presentation of the program on the air and its 
non-compliance with the cue sheet." (BELAPAN, 0725 GMT, 16 Mar 00; BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) What does that mean in English? 
Beklyamishchaw apparently allowed a filmmaker to say, "I flatly refuse to take 
money from this government" on the air. Shame, shame!  
 
How much will Lukashenka allow the demonstrators to say during their now 
illegal protest on 25 March? This is an interesting question that will no doubt 
have an enlightening answer. 
 31 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
If not a parade, how about a show trial? 
If the Russian military can't get a victory by 26 March, than perhaps the FSB can 
organize a show trial instead. Just as more and more Russians are beginning to 
ask probing questions about the authorship of the explosions in Buinansk, 
Volgodonsk, and Moscow, the FSB has nabbed a very plausible fall guy.  
 
Russian spokesmen rushed to interpret the capture of Salman Raduev on 12 
March as heralding a change in strategy against the Chechen resistance. Isn't it 
interesting that after more than six months of unbridled assault on the Chechen 
population, Moscow has announced a shift to the sort of limited operations 
against Chechen commanders it was supposedly carrying out all along?  
 
Indeed the federal forces sustained considerable losses as the Chechen 
resistance started to rely increasingly on guerrilla tactics. There were three 
humiliating defeats: On 1 March, 85 Russian servicemen from the Pskov MVD 
perished in an ambush near Ulus-Kert. On 2 March, dozens of MVD troops were 
killed in an ambush in Alkhan-Kala near Dzhokhar. On 12 March, a noted 
commander, Ruslan Gelaev, escaped from an encircled village, 
Komsomol'skaya. In view of these setbacks, repeated Russian assertions to the 
effect that the war is all but won ring hollow.  
 
The real significance of the operation against Raduev lies in its propagandistic 
value. The Moscow papers Novoya gazeta and Versiya have been investigating 
the possibility that the FSB covered up the discovery of similar explosives in 
Ryazan by saying they were part of a training exercise. (See Media section of 
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this issue and the Caucasus section of THE NIS OBSERVED, 29 Feb 00) Based 
on those reports, the YABLOKO Duma faction moved to hold a parliamentary 
inquiry into the Ryazan incident on 17 March. The initiative was blocked by other 
Duma factions, Putin's Unity faction chief among them. (www.yabloko.ru) Unity is 
certainly behaving as though there is something to hide and the FSB is hurriedly 
concocting a "show trial" that would draw public attention away from the Ryazan 
incident. 
 
One Moscow-based analyst, Sergei Khodorovsky, reports that "Raduyev was 
reportedly betrayed by his own bodyguards whilst negotiating a cash deal with 
the Russian secret agents. ... Now Russian TV audiences can look forward to a 
noisy show trial." (IWPR, 17 Mar 00) Raduev previously had promised to deliver 
Basaev to the FSB in return for $1 million. It seems he was negotiating this deal 
with the FSB when he was arrested.  
 
Raduev is charged with banditry, terrorism and murder in connection with the 
hostage-taking operation into the Dagestani city Kizlyar in December 1995. In 
addition, according to Deputy Prosecutor General Vasili Kolmogorov, only three 
days after his capture, Raduev had started "giving evidence, including evidence 
on the explosions in Moscow, Buinansk and Volgodonsk." (INTERFAX, 15 Mar 
00; via lexis-nexis) Of course there are still some suspenseful aspects to this 
story: For instance, is it possible to bring to light some convenient connections 
with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban? Can all this be served up to the cameras 
before the elections?  
 
Raduev was captured near Gudermes -- a stronghold of the Russian puppet and 
ex-convict Beslan Gantemirov. Four years ago, Raduev broke through several 
rings of federal troops to escape through mine fields from the village of 
Pervomayskoye, but last week he was arrested without a single shot. 
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During the last war he suffered head wounds which left him with "one glass eye, 
partial sight in the other, a plastic nose and a titanium plate in his skull," and 
came to be regarded as more than a little strange. Many conjectured that he was 
in the employ of the FSB or insane, particularly when he made the outrageous 
claim to have been behind the 1998 assassination attempt against Georgian 
President Eduard Shevardnadze. A political outcast, Raduev played no role in 
the present war. 
 
AZERBAIJAN/ARMENIA 
A region held hostage 
Regional cooperation in the energy field was boosted substantially when 
Azerbaijan and Georgia resolved the tariff issue that had been stalling 
negotiations on the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline for several months. The agreement 
was announced after a meeting of President Heyder Aliev and President Eduard 
Shevardnadze in Tbilisi. (CAUCASUS PRESS, 22 Mar 00) Azerbaijani 
concessions to Georgia follow closely on other concessions to Turkmenistan for 
the trans-Caspian line. These developments may reignite Western enthusiasm 
for the region and create some momentum for improving the regional security 
arrangements. 
 
Visions for a regional security architecture were presented as early as the 
November OSCE summit by Aliev and Armenian President Robert Kocharian. A 
fuller version of the concept, The Stability Pact, was presented by Turkey's 
President Suleiman Demirel at a meeting in Tbilisi in January. While the 
Caucasian states and Turkey seem eager to develop a regional pact, the 
Western leaders have been very slow to respond. Russia's acting President 
Vladimir Putin sent a positive response to Demirel's suggestion and President 
Jacques Chirac of France gave a lukewarm response; however, Bill Clinton kept 
mum on the matter until 23 March when Voice of Turkey Radio announced that 
he supported the idea of a regional pact and hoped it could be used to resolve 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
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In recent weeks Putin has been pushing his version of a regional infrastructure, 
the "Borjomi 4" (the three Caucasian states plus Russia), which held the first 
such meeting at the January CIS summit. The second such meeting is planned to 
accompany the April CIS summit and there is talk of holding more regular 
consultations. In a chilling recent statement, Putin aired plans to use Russian 
special forces on the territories of CIS states to quell "terrorism." The brutality 
with which Putin has implemented such ideas in Chechnya gives some indication 
of the danger the Caucasian states face if left alone with Russia. 
 
When asked if "the four" could sign a stability pact at their next meeting, the 
Azerbaijani foreign minister, Vilayet Guliev, reiterated that it cannot be 
considered "until the Karabakh conflict is solved." (CAUCASUS PRESS, 10 Mar 
00) So, the formation of an institution to promote regional cooperation and 
security is on hold not only until the West responds positively but until Armenia 
regains stability.  
 
For the time being the Armenian political scene remains very tense as the 
standoff between Prime Minister Aram Sarkisian and President Kocharian 
continues. Early in March the Sarkisian faction demanded the resignation of 
presidential supporters on the presidential staff and in the state television 
management because they had complained about the conduct of the 
investigation into the slayings of eight leading politicians in October 99. 
Kocharian responded by vigorously defending his allies and assuming greater 
control over military appointments, thus lessening his rival's influence over the 
military. Nagorno-Karabakh mirrored the tumult of Yerevan's political scene when 
an assassination attempt left the republic's president, Arkadi Ghukasian, 
seriously wounded. A rival politician, former Defense Minister Samvel Babayan, 
was immediately arrested in connection with the shooting. 
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Armenian politicians are deeply worried by the violence against top officials and 
the obviously politicized investigation which has targeted the president. Some, 
like the former vice speaker of the parliament, Ara Sahakian, say that the attack 
on the president's circle of advisers is a "catastrophe which could lead to us 
losing our independence." (IWPR, 17 Mar 00) Indeed, there is a 27-member 
group of parliamentarians pushing the idea of joining the Belarus-Russia Union. 
(CAUCASUS PRESS, 8 Mar 00) 
 
GEORGIA 
Possibility of expanding the OSCE observer mission seen 
During his conversation with visiting OSCE Secretary-General Jan Kubis, 
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze proposed extending the 
responsibilities of the OSCE observer mission to cover the entire length of the 
Georgian-Chechen border. Shevardnadze also suggested an expanded role for 
OSCE observers to work with UN observers in the Gali region in Abkhazia. 
(CAUCASUS PRESS, 21 Mar 00) 
 
The need for this mission became evident during the Fall when repeated Russian 
assertions that arms and mercenaries were reaching Chechnya from Georgian 
territory raised fears of a Russian incursion into Georgia; the observers were 
deployed during the winter. In the Spring, as the field of operations moves into 
the southern parts of Chechnya and the snow melts, allowing easier passage 
over the mountain passes, the danger of such spillover into Georgian territory 
mounts. In fact, a recent article in the Russian military newspaper Krasnaya 
zvezda charged that 30 Chechen gunmen and two Pakistanis were detained by 
Russian and Georgian border guards. (CAUCASUS PRESS, 21 Mar 00) An 
international presence on the border is essential to ensuring that such incidents 
don't escalate into more violent confrontations and are not used by Russia to 
reassert control over Georgia's borders.  
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Presently the OSCE mission consists of 17 officers and between 20-30 Tbilisi-
based civilian personnel. The vast majority of the observers are from East 
European and post-Soviet states, but the recent addition of two retired American 
officers raises hopes that more Western countries may contribute personnel to 
an expanded mission. According to the Georgian Border Guards chief, Valeri 
Chkheidze, the US has promised to supply surveillance equipment to monitor the 
border and the Georgians plan to establish 12 additional observation posts on 
the border. 
 
For the most part, Russian representatives have refrained from commenting on 
the mission. Since Russia has frequently supported the idea of an OSCE security 
architecture for Europe, it's awkward to complain about the OSCE taking on this 
role in this instance. However, when the mission was being established in 
December, the Russian representatives tried to pack it with Russian officers, only 
to be rebuffed by the OSCE officers in charge. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Strange bedfellows indeed 
The Baltic states continued their attempts to deal with their pasts, despite 
adversarial Russian reaction and skepticism from Israel, in a clear demonstration 
that the dissolution of the Soviet Union did not create a blank slate for domestic 
or international relations.  
 
Russia's acting president, Vladimir Putin, repeatedly tried to involve the West in 
his country's clamor over the trials of former KGB personnel, to no avail. Without 
mentioning the Baltic states directly, Putin demanded that US lawmakers 
stigmatize states "where veteran anti-fascists are being prosecuted with the 
connivance of former Nazis." (ITAR-TASS, 0956 GMT, 15 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-
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2000-0315, via World News Connection) Since Latvia's conviction of Vasily 
Kononov has brought about repeated accusations of human rights abuses by 
Putin et al., no country's name had to be listed in the demand to America. Alas, 
the US must live with the shame of being the second group, not the first, to be 
contacted by an offended Putin. The acting president earlier had tried to obtain 
OSCE intervention in the case, only to be told that such intervention does not fall 
within the OSCE's mandate in Latvia. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1400 GMT, 1 Mar 00)  
 
Despite Putin's exclamations, such prosecutions are destined to continue. The 
trial of another Soviet war veteran, Yevgeny Savenko, began in February. He is 
charged with crimes committed immediately following the Soviet Union's 1940 
occupation of Latvia. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1400 GMT, 28 
Feb 00) "Again a veteran of the Great Patriotic War has stood before the trial, an 
old, ill man...," decried a statement from the Russian foreign ministry. (BALTIC 
NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1400 GMT, 1 Mar 00) Latvian President 
Vaira Vike-Freiberga has repeatedly rejected claims by Russia that such trials 
were ideologically based and aimed at actions taken as persons fought Nazi 
supporters. She pointed out that Savenko is charged with crimes that occurred 
before war broke out between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. (BNS, 1313 
GMT, 2 Mar 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0302, via World News Connection) 
 
Although certainly the most vocal, Russia isn't the only country unhappy with the 
tenor of trials in the Baltic states. While the international community has been 
encouraging the countries to increase their attempts to prosecute war criminals 
(See THE NIS OBSERVED, 29 Feb 00), Israel has remained skeptical about 
Lithuania's willingness to seek justice. Conflict has arisen over the case of 
Nakhman Dushanski, a former high-ranking Soviet security officer suspected in 
the 1965 murder of Antanas Kraujelis. Prosecution of Dushanski, who is now 
living in Israel, was suspended last year after the Israeli Prosecutor's Office 
refused to provide legal assistance. However, the case has resumed now that 
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war criminals may be tried in absentia. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1100 GMT, 25 Feb 00) According to the Israeli embassy for the Baltic 
states, Israel's Ministry of Justice views the prosecution of Dushanski as 
"discriminatory," since Israel can list over 20 high-ranking former Lithuanian 
officers of the KGB and NKVD who are still living in Lithuania and who are not 
facing charges. "The decision to proceed vigorously against Mr. Dushanski while 
not proceeding at all against those Lithuanian nationals who served as his 
superior in the KGB... seems to be singling him out in a discriminatory manner," 
the statement said. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1700 GMT, 28 
Feb 00) Such "singling out" cannot help but exacerbate the existing tensions 
between the two countries, especially given the continuing anti-Semitism that 
exists in Lithuania, and demonstrates the diffidence with which that country 
continues to approach any acknowledgment of crimes committed against its 
citizens by its citizens in the past. 
 
Another lingering effect of the past has generated further controversy, and serves 
to highlight the dilemma many in the Baltics face in coming to terms with a history 
that includes Soviet and Nazi occupations. Estonian Riigikogu members have 
begun to debate a law on restoring property to persons who emigrated to 
Germany at the beginning of World War II. Prime Minister Mart Laar backs 
passage of the law, however, the bill faces the opposition of the People's Union 
faction. People's Union leader Villu Reiljan explained: "One cannot speak of 
citizenship as of June 16, 1940, because the people who then emigrated from 
Estonia renounced their Estonian citizenship." While neither side has shown 
much flexibility in the debate, Tonu Kauba, a member of the Center Party, said 
he holds out hope that some compromise is possible. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE 
DAILY REPORT, 1900 GMT, 22 Feb 00) 
 
Meanwhile, repatriates of Estonian descent from the former Soviet Union may 
soon begin to receive subsidies if they have no other sources of income. The 
Estonian government approved a plan under which persons of Estonian descent, 
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Estonian citizens, and their next of kin repatriating from the former USSR who 
are of pension age and lack any income over 800 kroons would be eligible for a 
government subsidy. The government submitted amendments to the social 
insurance law to include those provisions to parliament at the end of February. 
(BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1700 GMT, 29 Feb 00) 
 
Countries try to cope with not-so-silent minorities 
In addition to focusing on their citizens' pasts, the Baltic countries are looking to 
improve the present, with active attempts to integrate the diverse segments of 
society. In fact, Estonian's population minister, Katrin Saks, agreed to share the 
wisdom Estonian experts had gained in drafting their national program for the 
integration of ethnic minorities. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 
1900 GMT, 21 Feb 00) This move is all the more interesting since the Estonian 
program continues to be criticized within the country and is due to be revised to 
incorporate input from the president's ethnic minorities roundtable. Hagi Sein, the 
president's representative to the roundtable, said members made a number of 
proposals, including an increase in opportunities for language training. (BALTIC 
NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1100 GMT, 28 Feb 00) The language 
requirement remains a stumbling block: While the government has set up training 
centers, there has been a demonstrative lack of qualified teachers, funding, and 
materials. Thus, the fluency requirements and bureaucratic delays have been 
called "disincentives" for securing citizenship, according to a review by the US 
Department of State. (1999 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES, US Department of State; via 
www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/estonia.html) The 
report added, however, that there are at least 10 NGOs devoted to developing 
and implementing local integration assistance programs. 
 
One government move that may increase the numbers of persons eligible for 
citizenship is the decision by the Ministry of Education to equate school-leaving 
exams with language fluency. Students attending non-Estonian institutions now 
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may earn language proficiency certificates with their school exams. (BALTIC 
NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1700 GMT, 3 Mar 00) 
 
While Estonia and Latvia grapple with unceasing Russian complaints of 
(undocumented) human rights violations, representatives from another country -- 
Poland -- are claiming a "persecution of Lithuanian Poles." About 12 members of 
the Polish parliament, the Sejm, decried actions by the Lithuanian government 
which they perceive as impinging on the rights of ethnic Poles in Lithuania. Polish 
Foreign Minister Radislaw Sikorski assured the MPs that the ministry was paying 
attention to their concern and that, "in spite of existing problems, the situation of 
Lithuanian Poles is good." (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1100 
GMT, 22 Feb 00) 
 
Women and children first? Not yet 
A recent review by the US Department of State once more found no systematic 
violations of the rights of ethnic minorities in the Baltic states; however, the 
country reports noted problems still exist, particularly for women, children and 
prisoners. 
 
In Estonia, prison conditions remain poor, the report notes, and there continue "to 
be credible reports that police used excessive force and verbal abuse during the 
arrest and questioning of suspects." The government has refurbished some 
prison buildings and is working towards alleviating some of the overcrowding; in 
addition, a multi-year plan to refurbish and restructure all the country's prison and 
to close Tallinn Central Prison has been drafted, but has not yet been 
implemented, the report stated. News was good on one juridical layer, however. 
The State Department said the Estonian judicial system is independent in 
practice. Moreover, in general civil liberties are respected. And, the report noted, 
despite repeated allegations from Russia of human rights violations affecting 
noncitizens, the OSCE mission in Estonia and the OSCE High Commissioner on 
National Minorities said they could find no pattern of such abuses in the country. 
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(1999 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, US 
Department of State; via 
www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/estonia.html) 
 
Latvia also received generally favorable remarks in its country report, although, 
like Estonia, crime doesn't pay. The State Department noted there were "credible 
reports that police and prison personnel beat and mistreated prison inmates." 
And, unlike its neighbor to the north, in Latvia an "inefficient judiciary did not 
always ensure the fair administration of justice." The courts "must rely on the 
Ministry of Justice for administrative support, and the judiciary is not well trained, 
efficient, or free from corruption," the review warned. (1999 COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, US Department of State; via 
www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/latvia.html) Other 
concerns cited by the report included poor treatment of women in the home and 
the workplace, and child prostitution and abuse. 
 
Lithuania shared many of the same problems with the other Baltic states, chiefly 
prison conditions as well as violence and discrimination against women and 
children. The review noted some progress made by the government toward 
bringing police corruption under control, however, media reports indicate 
"incidents of police brutality are becoming more common." Physical abuse is not 
limited to the judicial system either: "Abuse of women at home is reportedly 
common, especially in connection with alcohol abuse by husbands," the report 
noted. "Child abuse in connection with alcohol abuse by parents is a serious 
problem" as well, the State Department said. Also noted was the fact that "a 
certain level of anti-Semitic sentiment persists," as indicated by the desecration 
of several Jewish cemeteries and the Holocaust Memorial at Paneriai, Nazi 
graffiti on a wall of a Jewish community building, and attacks by pro-Fascist 
youths. (1999 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, US 
Department of State; via 
www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/lithuani.html) Further 
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indication of such sentiment is provided by plans to found a Lithuanian National 
Social Party. A declaration to establish the new political bloc was signed by 
persons from Siauliai, Kaunas, Klaipeda, Panevezys, Marijampole and smaller 
towns. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1100 GMT, 28 Feb 00) 
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